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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[December

Recent Decisions
CIVIL PROCEDURE - ALIMONY AWARD SUBSEQUENT TO
EX PARTE DIVORCE

Mr. Armstrong while domiciled in Florida obtained by constructive
service a divorce decree against his wife who had established a domicile
in Ohio.1 Both parties were natives of Ohio but had become domiciled
during the 1920's in Florida, where they engaged in business. However,
they did not sever their Ohio ties and generally spent the summer months
on a farm which they had purchased there. In 1950 after marital difficulties developed between the Armstrongs, Mrs. Armstrong returned to
Ohio and she took up residence there. She had in her possession a strong
box containing securities owned by Mr. Armstrong and also some money
which she had withdrawn from their joint bank account.
Subsequent to the Florida decree Mrs. Armstrong sued her husband
for divorce and alimony in Ohio. The Ohio common pleas court demed
the divorce because the Florida court had already awarded a divorce to
the husband. However, since the Ohio court had personal jurisdiction
over both parties, it did make an award of alimony. Mr. Armstrong appealed to the court of appeals2 and then to the Supreme Court of Ohio, s
and in both instances the findings of the lower court were affirmed.
The basic problem confronting the Supreme Court of the Umted
States was whether the Ohio court could, in conformity with the requirements of full faith and credit,4 make an award of alimony after the husband had obtained a divorce in Florida by v=tue of constructive service
on the wife.
In affirming the Ohio decision the Supreme Court was divided in its
approach. 5 Four Justices concurred in interpreting the Florida decree as
not purporting to adjudicate the subject of alimony.6 They therefore
concluded that no constitutional issue of fall faith and credit was pre'Armstrong
123 N.E.2d
'Armstrong
'Armstrong

v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956), affirmmg, 162 Ohio St 406,
267 (1954), 4firmrng, 99 Ohio App. 7, 130 N.E.2d 710 (1954).
v. Armstrong, 99 Ohio App. 7, 130 N.E.2d 710 (1954)
v. Armstrong, 162 Ohio St 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954)

,U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
'Three opinions were written in which the court was divided 4,4,1.
'Relative to alimony the Florida decree stated that: 'This court, therefore, finds the
defendant has not come into this court in good faith or made any claim to the equitable conscience of the court and has made no showing of any need on her part for alimony. It is, therefore, specifically decreed that no award of alimony be made to the
", Armstiong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 569 (1956). It appears
defendant
that these four members of the court (Justices Burton, Harlan, Minton and Reed)
were quite liberal in their construction of the decree.

19561

RECENT DECISIONS

sented. The Ohio courts gave full recognition to the Florida divorce and
determined only the question of alimony, a subject which the Florida decree did not embrace.7
In a concurring opinion four Justices took the position that the
Florida decree specifically denied alimony. Thus having presented the
issue of full faith and credit, these Justices resolved the controversy on
the basis that Florida did not have sufficient jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against Mrs. Armstrong. Hence the part of the decree
pertaining to alimony was void, and as such Ohio need not give it full
faith and credit.
A third opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed his adoption of
the interpretation that Florida had not touched upon the subject of alimony. In addition he failed to find a federal issue since Ohio was merely dealing with property within its own borders.
The present holding of the Supreme Court is consistent with prior
decisions in the areas of divisible divorce, full faith and credit and due
process. The principle of divisible divorce was first established in Estin
v.Estm.s In the Estm case the court held that an ex parte divorce decree
could be effective insofar as it dissolved the marital relationship but
would be ineffective in the sphere of alimony. As in the present controversy the husband in the Estm case secured a foreign divorce decree
which made no provision for alimony by virtue of constructive service
upon the wife. However, Mrs. Estin had obtained a pror support order
which was held to survive the foreign decree. It should be noted that in
both the Estm and Armstrong cases the issue is unlike those in which the
wife is personally served or has made an appearance.9
In answering the husband's contention that the law of the matrmonial domicile (Florida) should govern, the court in the Armstrong case
10
wherein it was held that the
pointed to Williams v. North Carolina,
concept of matrimonial domicile was no longer appropriate. Also in line
with the Williams cases it was found that Ohio must uphold the Florida
divorce because of full faith and credit, but could challenge the findings
in relation to the wife's domicile.
The court in the present case implicitly reaffirmed the notion that
"Itshould be noted that the Florida decree specifically ordered Mrs. Armstrong to
return the securties which she had taken. These were the same securities which the
Ohio court ordered Mr. Armstrong to transfer to Mrs. Armstrong as alimony.
"Estin v. Esun, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). See Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948).
*See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
a Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina,

317 U.S. 287 (1942)

(two cases).

"May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226 (1945); 143 AJLR. 1294 (1943).

